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Much of the discussion on
the relative superiority of one system
over another ignores the possibility
that these systems are the products
of particular legal and regulatory
environments that may be difficult
to create in other countries.
In the postwar period, dramatically differ-
ent systems of corporate finance and gover-
nance have emerged among the major
industrialized countries. Even the casual observer
notices large differences between the way firms
finance and govern themselves in the United
States on the one hand, and in Japan and
Germany on the other. Why should corporate
finance and governance systems differ so dra-
matically across countries? The difference poses
a problem for the theory of corporate finance
and governance. Theoretically, there is a single
best way to organize and finance firms. Since we
should expect finance and governance systems
to converge to this optimum, we ought not
to find much difference in these mechanisms
across countries. The large differences we actu-
ally observe thus suggest accidents of history or
culture or factors that theory ignores—such as
differences in the laws, rules, and regulations
that govern the financial systems of industrial-
ized countries.
Recently, much has been written in the
scholarly and policy-oriented literature on the
relative merits of the different corporate finance
systems in the developed countries.1 There is,
however, little focus on the reasons we observe
such differences despite the problems these
differences pose for the theory of corporate
finance.2 Many studies appear implicitly to
assume that the outcomes we observe are essen-
tially cultural or historical accidents. And much
of the discussion on the relative superiority of
one system over another ignores the possibility
that these systems are the products of particular
legal and regulatory environments that may be
difficult to create in other countries.
I argue in this article that there are, in fact,
large legal and regulatory differences among the
United States, Japan, and Germany that affect
the corporate financial systems in place. The
differences are essentially of three kinds. First is
the severity of the legal and regulatory restraints
on large investors’ being “active” investors in
firms. U.S. laws are in general much more hos-
tile to investors’ taking large influential stakes in
firms than are the laws of Japan or Germany.
Second is the degree to which sources of non-
bank finance are actively suppressed. For much
of the postwar period, the development of secu-
rities markets in Japan and Germany has been
impeded by discriminatory taxation, regulatory
fiat, and cumbersome mandated issuance proce-
dures. Third is the degree to which corporate
securities markets have been “passively” sup-
pressed by the absence of any strong mandated,
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wishing to issue securities to outside investors.
U.S. disclosure requirements have been much
more severe than those in Japan or Germany.
These differences may have been important in
determining the relative speed of securities mar-
kets development if there is a large public good
aspect to the production of information by firms
seeking external finance that only the imposi-
tion of government-backed disclosure require-
ments can solve.
I argue these legal and regulatory differ-
ences are largely responsible for the very differ-
ent systems of corporate finance and governance
in the United States, Japan, and Germany. One
natural question is, Which system is superior in
terms of providing external finance at the lowest
cost? The academic literature on this topic does
not yield a clear conclusion as to the more
efficient system, or whether any efficiency dif-
ferences are large enough to be of practical
relevance. However, I point out that this litera-
ture ignores that changes in technology, the
globalization of financial markets, and the chang-
ing structure of the firm may have made the
Japanese and German systems of finance and
governance less attractive systems over time.
There is evidence that the U.S. system of fi-
nance, for example, is more favorable to the
growth of new, high-technology companies than
are the German and Japanese systems.
Perhaps in response to the perceived ad-
vantages of the U.S. system, the legal and regu-
latory environments of the German and Japanese
systems are changing rapidly, and securities
markets are being substantially deregulated in
an effort to increase their importance as a source
of firm finance. However, it is important to
realize that the regulatory environment of the
U.S. financial system is changing, too, albeit
much more slowly than the German or Japanese
system, as financial institutions are being given
more latitude to be active investors in firms.
Thus, over the long term, the legal and regula-
tory environments of all three countries appear
to be converging, and the focal point of this
convergence is not the Japanese/German or U.S.
system as it currently stands but an entirely new
environment where financial institutions are
free to be active investors and where corporate
securities markets are unhindered by regulatory
obstacles.
These issues are fundamental to the theory
of the firm, corporate finance, and corporate
governance that have engaged academic debate
for many years. However, recently they have
taken on a policy relevance not experienced
before. In the United States, there has been an
intense, ongoing debate about the most pre-
ferred methods of financing and governing firms.3
And in the last few years, both Japan and Ger-
many have substantially deregulated their cor-
porate securities markets. In addition, the stark
differences between these systems provide alter-
native paths of development for policymakers
in a whole host of countries considering re-
vamping their financial systems. These include
developed countries such as France and Italy, as
well as the excommunist countries of Central
Europe and many of the emerging market
countries of Latin America and Asia, which all
face decisions about how to craft the outlines
of their rapidly developing financial markets.
In doing so, they would undoubtedly appreciate
an understanding of the factors behind the dif-
ferences in the major industrialized countries’
financial systems and their relative costs and
benefits. This article addresses these issues by
describing in detail the important characteristics
of the corporate financing systems in the United
States, Japan, and Germany, examining why
such differences exist, and comparing some of
their strengths and weaknesses.
In the following section, I describe the
corporate finance and governance system in the
United States, Japan, and Germany, highlighting
the major differences. I then focus on the major
legal and regulatory factors I believe are the
main determinant of these differences. Finally, I
look at why the Japanese/German system and
the U.S. system may be converging and explore
some implications of this convergence.
Corporate finance and governance
across countries
All corporate finance markets must ad-
dress two generic information problems faced
by firms attempting to raise funds from outsid-
ers: sorting problems and incentive problems.
Sorting problems arise in the course of
selecting investments: firm owners and manag-
ers typically know much more about their busi-
ness than do outsiders, and it is in their interests
to accent the positive while downplaying poten-
tial difficulties. Sorting problems and their impli-
cations for corporate finance were first analyzed
by Leland and Pyle (1977) and Ross (1977), who
emphasized that the choice of capital structure
was important in minimizing such problems.
More generally, potential outside financiers must
conduct extensive information gathering and
verifying activities in order to minimize such
information asymmetries.
Incentive problems arise in the course of
the firm’s operations. Firm managers have many4
opportunities to benefit themselves at the ex-
pense of outside investors. Jensen and Meckling
(1976) were the first to address these issues.
They stressed that a combination of methods
is usually needed to align the incentives of
managers and investors, including the use of an
appropriate capital structure, collateral, security
covenants, and direct monitoring. Diamond
(1991) highlighted the role of reputation in miti-
gating incentive problems: managers of firms
that have a stake in maintaining a good reputa-
tion with outside investors have strong incen-
tives not to act opportunistically at the investors’
expense.
Information problems vary in severity across
firms. The firm’s age, size, growth rate, and line
of business all influence the degree of informa-
tion problems it poses to outside investors. For
example, firms with heavy investments in tan-
gible fixed assets pose less severe information
problems to investors because they may be able
to offer some of their fixed assets as collateral to
potential creditors and because monitoring the
sale of fixed assets or their transformation from
one use to another is likely to be easier than it is
for more liquid assets. Conversely, firms that
focus on research and development may have
wide scope for discretionary behavior, since the
risk implicit in a particular research and devel-
opment program cannot easily be monitored or
controlled by outside investors. Finally, other
things being equal, small firms pose greater
information problems than large firms. Smaller
firms do not produce detailed information about
themselves and are often too young to have a
credible reputation. Larger, public firms make
available detailed information about their activi-
ties and have a bigger stake in maintaining a
good reputation among potential financiers.
The following section describes the struc-
ture of U.S., Japanese and German corporate
financial markets and how they address these
information problems.
The U.S. system
The U.S. system is developed broadly and
deeply enough to allow a large variety of suppli-
ers of finance to compete with one another in a
number of different finance markets. These mar-
kets differ from one another partly in the degree
to which they are designed to mitigate the infor-
mation problems posed by firms. This differen-
tiation provides a natural selection mechanism
as to which firms use which markets. While
banks play an important financing role, they are
more limited by regulation than in Japan or
Germany. Conversely, more liberal regulation of
securities markets permits a greater role for se-
curities financing than in Japan or Germany.
Although banks dominate U.S. short-term
finance markets, they have much competition
from finance companies, savings institutions,
and the commercial paper market, which is an
option for larger, more highly rated firms
(Figure 1).4 While banks are still an extremely
important source of funds for small firms, over
the past fifteen years rapid consolidation of the
banking industry has led to a decrease in small
business lending. Bank lending to large firms
has also shown declines in recent years, possi-
bly owing to increasing competition from other
intermediaries and from securities markets.5
Securities markets play a more important
role in long-term financing than in short-term
financing, and they play a more important over-
all role in corporate financing than in most other
countries (Figure 2). The public bond market is
the largest source of long-term finance because
it caters to the biggest firms that have the largest
Figure 1
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capital needs. The public equity market is also
an extremely important source of long-term
funds for large firms and small, fast growing
firms that make initial public offerings. Two
private markets—the private bond and private
equity markets—are often the only realistic
sources of long-term finance for small and middle
market companies. These markets involve the
issuance of securities that are exempt from
registration with the Securities and Exchange
Commission and, thus, free from much of the
expense in money and time of the registration
process and the continuing reporting and disclo-
sure requirements. The largest of these private
markets is the private placement, or private
bond, market. It offers long-term debt at fixed
interest rates and is a significant source of funds
for middle-market firms with annual revenues
between $100 million and $500 million that are
generally not large enough to issue public
bonds.6 The private equity market consists of
equity investments in small and medium-sized
firms professionally managed by specialized in-
termediaries, mostly limited partnerships.7
Just as firms vary in the degree to which
they suffer from sorting and incentive problems,
U.S. corporate finance markets differ in the ex-
tent to which they are designed to mitigate these
problems. Thus, as shown in Table 1, small
firms are forced to raise funds in markets that
have developed the greatest safeguards to miti-
gate information problems, such as the private
equity and bank loan market. Medium-sized
firms may be able to tap the private bond mar-
ket, while larger or more promising middle-
market firms may be able to issue public equity.
Large firms that suffer least from information
problems gravitate toward the markets with the
fewest such safeguards and where capital is the
cheapest, such as the public bond and commer-
cial paper markets.
Two common features in the bank loan,
private placement, and private equity markets
safeguard against the most severe information
problems that occur in smaller firms. First, inves-
tors in these markets have the expertise and
resources to obtain and analyze information
about the firms that solicit them for money,
helping to mitigate the sorting problem. Second,
investors use various control mechanisms to in-
fluence the firm after funds are invested to en-
sure that it makes proper use of their capital,
which helps mitigate the monitoring problem.
For example, tight covenants in bank loans and
private placements help control risk and con-
strain opportunistic behavior. Private equity in-
vestors use a number of mechanisms to give
them influence, including board representation
and voting rights. In addition, they will typically
control the firm’s access to subsequent capital.
Fast-growing firms depend crucially on the ini-
tial investors to either provide subsequent capi-
tal themselves or find other investors to do so.
Finally, management is almost always given a
significant stock ownership, which more closely
aligns management’s incentives with those of
the private equity investors.
Large, public firms share some of small
firms’ information problems, though to a lesser
extent. The public bond and equity markets
have a number of characteristics that help miti-
gate these problems. First, there are a host of
stock and bond analysts, ratings agencies, and
other advisors that analyze the operations and
reports of large firms and offer opinions about
whether the firm is worthy of new capital. Sec-
ond, the public equity market is highly liquid,
making the threat of a takeover of a firm that is
performing poorly a credible one in many cases,
helping to discipline management to act in share-
holders’ interests.
The German/Japanese systems
Although there are some differences, meth-
ods of finance and governance in Japan and
Germany share a number of important charac-
teristics. In particular, they both look very differ-
ent from those of the United States.
First, there has been a much less diverse
spectrum of finance markets available to firms in
Japan or Germany than in the United States.
Japanese and German firms, regardless of their
size or the severity of their information prob-
lems, have traditionally relied more on bank
financing than have U.S. firms, while securities
markets have been much less important. For
example, from 1970 to 1985, intermediated loans
(principally from banks) comprised 85 percent
Table 1
Capital Sources for Firms
Firm size
Small Medium Large
Information availability Low More High
Sorting/incentive
problems: High Less Low
Capital sources Angel capital
Private equity Private equity
Bank loans Bank loans Bank loans
Private bonds
Public equity Public equity
Public bonds
Commercial paper6
of the total gross external financing of Japanese
nonfinancial firms, with only 15 percent sourced
from bond and equity markets.8 German nonfi-
nancial firms raised 88 percent of their gross
external funds from intermediated loans over
the same period, with only 12 percent from
securities markets.9
Another important characteristic of the fi-
nancial systems of Germany and Japan is the
closeness of ties between banks and their cor-
porate borrowers, which are much tighter than
the traditional arm’s length relationships observed
in the United States. One important aspect of
these tight relationships is the ownership of
equity of nonfinancial firms by banks. Unlike in
the United States, banks are the most important
large shareholders in firms in both countries. In
Japan, they own over 20 percent of the out-
standing common stock of nonfinancial firms. In
Germany, they own 10 percent, but under cur-
rent law they have great flexibility to vote ac-
cording to their own wishes the additional 14
percent of common stock owned by individuals
but held by banks in trust for them. In contrast,
U.S. banks own negligible amounts of nonfinan-
cial firms’ equity.
Banks consequently have a potentially
powerful position as active monitors in both
Germany and Japan. First, they have typically
comprised the lion’s share of external finance to
firms and may, therefore, exercise influence
through their control of the firm’s access to
external funds. Second, the loans they make are
often short-term in nature. In normal times, they
would be rolled over on an almost automatic
basis, but should questions arise about manage-
ment strategy or quality, the bank always has
the option of not renewing the loan at a fairly
frequent interval. Finally, their large shareholder
status means that they have both the incentive
and ability to directly monitor management
through their presence on the board and the
votes they can exercise at the shareholders
meeting.
Unlike U.S. banks, banks in Germany and
Japan have effectively acted as insiders to firms.
They have had great access to information about
the firm’s operations and have had the ability to
Table 2
Stock Market Capitalization, 1985
(As a Percentage of GNP)
United
States Japan Germany
Unadjusted 51 71 29
Adjusted 48 37 14
NOTE: Adjusted figures are corrected for the
double-counting of shares associated with
intercorporate share holdings.
SOURCES: Borio (1990) and national data.
Table 4
Summary Statistics of Ownership
Concentration of Large Nonfinancial Corporations
(Percentage of Outstanding Shares Owned by the Largest Five Shareholders)
United States Japan Germany
Mean 25.4 33.1 41.5
Median 20.9 29.7 37.0
Standard deviation 16.0 13.8 14.5
Minimum 1.3 10.9 15.0
Maximum 87.1 85.0 89.6
Mean firm size1
  (millions of US$, 1980) 3,505 1,835 3,483
Mean firm size2
  (millions of US$, 1980) 1,287 811 1,497
1 Measured by total assets.
2 Measured by market value of equity.
NOTE: The samples were as follows: United States—457 nonfinancial corporations in 1980;
Japan—143 mining and manufacturing corporations in 1984; and Germany—41
nonfinancial corporations in 1990.
SOURCES: For the United States and Japan, Prowse (1992); for Germany, Prowse (1993).
Size data converted to US$, using 1980 average exchange rates and deflated
by U.S. consumer prices.
Table 3
Composition of Companies’
Credit Market Debt, 1985
(As a Percentage of Total Credit Market Debt)
United
States Japan Germany
Securities 55 9 6
Intermediated
debt 45 91 94
of which,
from banks 36 NA 88
NOTE: Credit market debt excludes trade debt.
Intermediated debt refers to loans from
financial intermediaries. Securities includes
commercial paper and other short-term bills
and long-term bonds.
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engage in monitoring and influencing manage-
ment. Banks’ dual role as important lenders and
shareholders has given them a primary role in
the financing and governing of firms.
U.S. and German/Japanese
systems compared
These differences between corporate fi-
nance systems show up in a variety of ways.
First, the relative importance of corporate securi-
ties markets across industrialized countries dif-
fers dramatically. Stock market capitalization (as
a share of gross domestic product) is much
larger in the United States than in Japan and
Germany after adjustment for the double-count-
ing associated with intercorporate shareholding
(Table 2).10 Corporate bond markets also differ
dramatically in size across countries. In Japan
and Germany, less than 10 percent of nonfinan-
cial corporations’ credit market debt was in the
form of securities in 1985, compared with more
than 50 percent in the United States (Table 3).
These differences also show up in the financing
patterns of individual large firms in the three
countries. For example, in 1994, the two largest
firms in Germany, Daimler-Benz and Siemens,
had long-term debt securities outstanding ac-
counting for 10 percent and 2 percent, respec-
tively, of their total assets. In Japan, the numbers
for Toyota and Nissan were 10 percent and 4
percent, respectively. In contrast, the percentage
of total assets financed by long-term bond secu-
rities for two of the largest U.S. firms were 30
percent for Ford and 20 percent for GE.
Corporate ownership structures in the Un-
tied States, Japan, and Germany also differ
markedly. Ownership concentration is signifi-
cantly higher in Japan and Germany than in the
United States (Table 4). The holdings of the
largest five shareholders average over 40 per-
cent in Germany, 33 percent in Japan, and only
25 percent in the United States. Many of the
large shareholders in Japan and Germany are
banks with lending ties to the firm.
Another major difference is the frequency
of corporate takeovers. The market for corpo-
rate control is much less active in Japan and
Germany (Table 5). Part of the reason for the
much greater merger and acquisition activity in
the United States is, of course, the larger number
of companies listed on the stock market. How-
ever, even after normalizing the dollar value of
mergers and acquisitions by stock market capi-
talization, the U.S. merger market appears fif-
teen to twenty times more active than those in
Japan or Germany.
Hostile takeovers are also very much less
frequent in Japan or Germany than in the United
States. Table 6 illustrates the paucity of hostile
offers (whether ultimately successful or not) in
continental Europe compared with those in the
United States (no comparable data for Japan are
available). The differences across countries in
actual, completed hostile takeovers are even
more striking. Since World War II, for example,
there have only been four successful hostile
takeovers in Germany (see Franks and Mayer
1993). Kester (1991) claims that the use of take-
overs in large Japanese firms is very infrequent.
Conversely, in the United States, almost 10 per-
cent of the Fortune 500 in 1980 have since been
acquired in a transaction that was hostile or that
started off as hostile.11
Legal and regulatory determinants of
corporate financial systems
Much of the scholarly and policy-oriented
literature is silent on the reasons for the differ-
ences in corporate finance and governance sys-
tems across countries. Studies that do focus on
differences in the legal and regulatory environ-
ment mistakenly focus on only one aspect of it:
Table 6
Hostile Takeovers and Leveraged Buyouts as a
Percentage of All Attempted Transactions, 1985–89
United States Rest of Europe
Hostile takeovers 17.8 9.6
Leveraged buyouts 20.0 2.7
NOTES: Hostile offers are defined as those transactions in which the acquiring company proceeds
with its offer against the wishes of the target company’s management. Data include both
completed and withdrawn transactions.
SOURCES: Securities Data Corp.; Mergers and Corporate Transactions database.
Table 5
Average Annual Volume of Completed Domestic Mergers and
Corporate Transactions with Disclosed Values, 1985–89
United States Japan Germany
Volume 1,070 61.3 4.2
(in billions of US$)
As a percentage
of total market capitalization 41.1 3.1 2.3
NOTES: Dollar values calculated at current exchange rates for each of the five years covered.
Market capitalization figures are for 1987, converted to dollars at prevailing exchange rate.
SOURCES: For the United States and Germany, Securities Data Corp., Mergers and Corporate
Transactions database; for Japan, Yamaichi Securities Corp., as reported in Beiter
(1991).8
differences in the degree to which banks are
allowed to be active investors in firms.12
In fact, there are large legal and regulatory
differences among the United States, Japan, and
Germany that affect the corporate financial sys-
tems in place. These differences are of three
kinds. First is the aforementioned severity of the
restraints on large investors being active inves-
tors in firms. Second is the degree to which
sources of nonbank finance are actively sup-
pressed. Finally, there are differences regarding
disclosure requirements by firms wishing to is-
sue securities. All these differences play a role in
determining the different outcomes observed
across countries. I consider them in turn.
Restraints on ownership of corporate equity.
As Table 7 documents, financial institutions in
Japan and Germany are generally given much
more latitude to own shares in and exert control
over firms than they are in the United States.
In the United States, financial institutions
face significant constraints on their ability to
take large stock positions in firms and use
them for corporate control purposes.13 Banks
are simply prohibited from owning any stock
on their own account. Bank holding com-
panies cannot own more than 5 percent of any
unaffiliated, nonsubsidiary, nonbank firm with-
out Federal Reserve Board approval, and their
holdings must be passive.14 Bank trust depart-
ments are allowed to hold equity for the benefi-
cial owners. However, they cannot invest more
than 10 percent of their trust funds in any one
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almost 60 percent of total
life insurance industry
assets, places a limit of
20 percent of a life in-
surer’s assets, or one-half
of its surplus, that can be
invested in equity, and a
limit of 2 percent of its
assets that can be in-
vested in the equity of
any one firm. Other states
have similar rules. Prop-
erty and casualty insurers
are prohibited outright
from owning a non-
insurer.  Mutual funds are
subject to tax and regula-
tory penalties if they own more than 10 percent
of the stock of any one firm. Pension fund
investments are governed by the Employment
Retirement Income Securities Act of 1974 (ERISA).
ERISA requires all pension funds to be diversi-
fied, allowing little room for an influential posi-
tion in a company.
U.S. securities laws discourage concen-
trated, active shareholding by investors in gen-
eral. First, all entities acquiring 5 percent or
more of a company must file with the SEC,
outlining the group’s plans and revealing its
ownership and sources of finance. Second, any
stockholder who exercises control over a firm
may be liable for the acts of the firm. Third,
insider trading rules restrict large active share-
holders from short-term trading of stock they
own. Thus, Bhide (1993) reports that pension
fund managers are reluctant to own more than
10 percent of a firm because this would restrict
the liquidity of their stake, which by law they
have a responsibility to protect. Finally, the legal
doctrine of equitable subordination discourages
all creditors from taking equity positions in the
firm, since their loans are subject to subordina-
tion should they exert control.
In Japan, there are far fewer regulations
constraining particular financial institutions from
holding corporate stock or from using the stock
they own for corporate control purposes. The
sole restrictions derive from the Anti-Monopoly
Act, which until 1987 limited a bank’s holdings
of a firm’s shares to 10 percent (the limit has
since been lowered to 5 percent). Insurance
companies are similarly restricted to owning at
most 10 percent of a firm. Antitrust laws and
insider trading legislation on paper look similar
to those of the United States. However, there is
widespread recognition that they are not en-
forced by the authorities.
The institutional structure of the German
financial system is based on the universal bank-
ing principle. Universal banks can hold what-
ever share of equity they like in any nonfinancial
firm, limited only by a number of prudential
rules that do not appear to be particularly bind-
ing.15 Antitrust laws have not been used to dis-
courage intercorporate shareholdings as they have
in the United States. And for much of the post-
war period, there was no explicit legislation
against insider trading: Germany has only re-
cently adopted the European Community stan-
dards regarding the establishment of minimum
levels of shareholder protection.
Suppression of sources of nonbank finance
in Japan and Germany. Table 8 documents some
of the legal and regulatory restraints on access
to external nonbank finance by nonfinancial
firms in Japan and Germany in the postwar
period. Unlike in the United States, significant
obstacles have confronted firms wishing to raise







Issuance prohibited until November
1987.
Stringent criteria for issuance
of straight and convertible bonds
until 1987.
One-year approval period for foreign
bond issuance until 1982; restrictions
on issuance of Euroyen bonds until
1984; withholding tax on interest
income of nonresidents until 1985;
Eurobond issuance restrictions eased
further in 1992.
Heavy taxes on equity transactions
until 1988.
Germany
Issuance discouraged until 1992
by issue authorization procedure and
securities transfer taxes.
Issuance discouraged until 1992
by issue authorization procedure and
securities transfer taxes.
Issuance abroad required prior
notification of the authorities
and was subject to maturity restrictions
until 1989; issuance of foreign currency
bonds prohibited until 1990.
New share issues must be offered to
existing shareholders first. One-percent
corporation tax on all equity issues until
1992. Secondary trading in equities
subject to securities transfer tax until
1992, ranging from 0.1 percent to 0.25
percent. Annual net asset tax of 1 per-
cent on corporate net assets, payable
irrespective of net income position.
SOURCES: Döser and Broderson (1990); Takeda and Turner (1992).
Table 8
Legal and Regulatory Constraints on Nonfinancial Firms’ Access to Nonbank Finance10
until the mid-1980s in Japan and until very re-
cently in Germany.
Until the early 1980s, Japanese firms had
no direct recourse to capital markets for ex-
ternal finance. The domestic bond market was
open to only a few government-owned firms or
electric utilities. The Bond Issuance Committee
set severe eligibility requirements on issuers of
corporate bonds through a detailed set of ac-
counting criteria that in 1979 only permitted two
firms to issue unsecured bonds domestically.
These requirements were gradually relaxed in
the mid-1980s, so that, by 1989, about 300
firms were eligible to issue unsecured straight
bonds.16 Similar restrictions on access to the
Eurobond market were relaxed in stages from
1982. Commercial paper issuance was prohib-
ited by the authorities until 1987. While not
directly restricted, equity issuance was discour-
aged by heavy taxes on transactions in equities
until 1988.
Restrictions on nonbank finance in Ger-
many have been significant until even more
recently. Issuance of commercial paper and
longer term bonds was hampered by require-
ments under the issue authorization procedure
and the securities transfer tax (see Deutsche
Bundesbank 1992). The issue authorization re-
quirements included obtaining prior approval
by the Federal Ministry of Economics. Such ap-
proval was granted if the issuer’s credit standing
was satisfactory and if a bank supported the
application. While this procedure was a formal-
ity for large German firms, it added to the effec-
tive cost of a bond issue because firms could not
generally issue the bonds at a time of their own
choosing but were forced to wait for approval
from the ministry. The securities transfer tax
often imposed a considerable burden on the
secondary market for corporate securities, par-
ticularly at its short end. Foreign issuance of
corporate debt has been subject to similar re-
strictions. Equity issuance and secondary trading
of equities historically have been subject to a
variety of taxes that have generally made equity
uncompetitive with bank loans as a form of
external finance (see Döser and Broderson 1990).
Most important, however, has been the legal
requirement for employee representation on
boards of publicly listed firms, which has dis-
couraged many private firms from going public
(see Borio 1990). Overall, these restrictions have
made securities issuance “not a viable alterna-
tive for most German businesses.”17
Fostering nonbank finance in the United
States through disclosure requirements. Quite
apart from the active discrimination against
nonintermediated forms of finance, the lax dis-
closure requirements in Japan and Germany
may have been an additional (passive) factor in
discouraging the development of securities
markets.
Firms in the United States wishing to issue
securities to the public have been required to
disclose much more information than those in
Japan and Germany. Results from a recent
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development survey, which rated the degree
of information disclosure by firms relative to
OECD guidelines, illustrate this pattern.18 Table
9 illustrates the results for two areas of disclo-
sure—operating results and intragroup pricing
policies. Two-thirds of U.S. firms surveyed had
fully implemented the OECD disclosure guide-
lines for operating results; the rest had partially
implemented them. In Germany none of the
firms surveyed and in Japan less than 10 percent
of those surveyed had fully implemented the
guidelines. The results for disclosure of intra-
group pricing policies (and other areas not re-
ported here) reveal a similar pattern.
There is a fairly intense academic debate
as to the effects of mandated corporate disclo-
sure requirements, with no conclusive answer.
One hypothesis is that mandated disclosure rules
help firms make credible commitments to out-
side investors to provide honest and timely dis-
closure and protection from market manipulation
or insider trading. In this view, for strategic,
competitive reasons firms may not have suffi-
cient incentives voluntarily to provide the finan-
cial information outside investors would require
to consider extending such finance (for example,
they may be afraid that competitors could take
advantage of such information). Thus, absent a
regulatory requirement for adequate disclosure
Table 9
Selected Results from a Survey of the Implementation of
OECD Guidelines on the Disclosure of Information by
Multinational Enterprises
(Number of Firms)
Implementation of Implementation of
guidelines on disclosure of guidelines on disclosure of
Country operating results1 intragroup pricing policies2
Not Not
Full Partial implemented Full Partial implemented
United States 34 19 0 29 0 18
Japan 2 21 0 2 0 17
Germany 0 19 0 0 0 15
1 Includes industrial and financial firms.
2 Industrial firms only.
SOURCE: OECD, “Disclosure of Information by Multinational Enterprises,” Working Document
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to outside investors, the development of a liquid
market for corporate securities may be effec-
tively impeded. Proponents of such a view in-
clude Dye (1990), Dye and Magee (1991), and
Demski and Feltham (1994).
The alternative hypothesis is that regula-
tion unduly constrains the choices of firms and
investors and prevents efficient contracting. In
this view, firms have sufficient incentives to
provide the optimal amount of disclosure to
obtain external financing and regulations man-
dating such disclosure are, at best, irrelevant
and, at worst, burdensome and costly on both
firms and investors. Proponents of this view
include Bentson (1973), Leftwich (1980), Watts
and Zimmerman (1986), and Phillips and
Zecher (1981).
Ultimately, the effect of mandated disclo-
sure requirements is an empirical issue. Unfortu-
nately, only a limited amount of research bears
on this topic. Stock price studies of firms before
and after the 1933 Securities Act suggest that
mandated disclosure regulations impose costs
on firms (see Benston 1973 and Chow 1983). On
the other hand, Sylla and Smith (1995) explain
the differing speeds of development of stock
markets in the United States and U.K. since 1800
on differences in mandated disclosure rules. They
attribute the faster development of the stock
market in the U.K. in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries to the various companies
acts between 1844 and 1900 that required sub-
stantial disclosure by firms wishing to issue eq-
uity. Disclosure requirements were significantly
less onerous in the United States until the 1930s,
when the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 went
beyond even what the British had put in place.
Sylla and Smith claim these disclosure rules were
responsible for putting the United States ahead
of the U.K. in terms of the size and depth of the
stock market in the immediate postwar period.
While this debate is far from settled, it is
possible that the marked differences in disclo-
sure requirements among countries may, in part,
be responsible for the differences in the relative
speeds of development of corporate securities
markets.
Costs and benefits of different systems of
finance and governance
There has been much debate about the
efficiency of the different systems of corporate
finance and governance we observe in the in-
dustrialized countries, with no clear consensus.
While the academic and policy-oriented litera-
ture often finds specific advantages in a particu-
lar country’s financing and governance systems,
it has not found demonstrably cheaper capital
for firms or obviously superior mechanisms of
corporate control in any one country.
The academic literature to date makes the
following points: first, there are some advan-
tages in fostering tight ties between banks and
firms. Prowse (1990), Hoshi et al. (1990a),
Lichtenberg and Pushner (1993), Cable (1985),
and Elston (1993) all provide evidence suggest-
ing that the concentrated holding of debt and
equity claims by financial institutions in Ger-
many and Japan mitigates the information prob-
lems of external finance and governance to a
greater extent than in the United States, where
ties between banks and firms are more arm’s
length.
However, there are also advantages to hav-
ing large, active corporate securities markets.
Porter (1992) and Sahlman (1990) provide evi-
dence that the U.S. system appears better at
funding emerging companies and new (often
high-technology) business activities than the
German or Japanese system. Franks and Mayer
(1992) argue that such a comparative advantage
is the reason for the predominance of high-
technology firms in the fields of oil exploration,
biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and computer
software in the United States. Porter also claims
that liquid U.S. capital markets are able to reallo-
cate capital from low- to high-growth sectors
more efficiently than those of Japan and Ger-
many.
The specific advantages of each system do
not appear to translate into overall measurable
differences in either the cost of external financ-
ing or the effectiveness of the corporate control
mechanism. There are legions of cost of capital
studies with no clear message as to which
system delivers external finance to firms at the
lowest cost.19 And Kaplan (1993a, 1993b) re-
ports that top management turnover exhibits
similar sensitivities to measures of poor firm
performance in the United States, Japan, and
Germany. Conversely, both systems clearly
have their embarrassing examples of break-
downs in corporate control. The German and
Japanese systems appear particularly susceptible
to potential problems involving “who monitors
the monitor?”20 The U.S. system appears to
have particular weaknesses when, for one rea-
son or another, hostile takeovers pose no
credible threat to current management.21 Over-
all, it may well be that neither system clearly
dominates the other. After all, firms from all
three countries have been competing interna-
tionally with each other for years, yet no obvi-
ous winner has emerged.12
Perhaps the most important consideration
in evaluating the effectiveness of each system is
the system’s long-run stability, a factor many
studies ignore. It appears that the legal and
regulatory environment that sustains the corpo-
rate finance system in Japan and Germany is not
stable, but is changing rather rapidly. These
changes may be a result of a conscious decision
by policymakers in these countries to capture
some of the aforementioned advantages of the
U.S. system in financing emerging high-technol-
ogy ventures. Or they may have resulted from
the fact that legal and regulatory systems have
costs, both economic and political, the bulk of
which may have little to do with the particular
mechanism of corporate finance and governance
they support and which have increased in re-
sponse to changes in the power of vested inter-
ests, financial innovations, and other market
developments.
Japan is the clearest example of this phe-
nomenon. The regulatory and legal structure of
the Japanese financial system has been changing
since the 1970s under both domestic and inter-
national pressure for reform. One aspect of Japa-
nese deregulation has been the gradual removal
of restrictions on nonbank finance. Rosenbluth
(1988) argues that the strict regulation of Japa-
nese corporate finance in favor of bank lending
until the early 1980s proved unsustainable in the
face of growing competition from the
Euromarkets and the decline in profitability of
domestic bank lending after the removal of in-
terest rate controls.
Ties between banks and large firms in
Japan that have easy access to the Euromarkets
and the developing domestic bond market are
weakening substantially in response to this
deregulation, as the financing patterns of many
firms are changing (see Hoshi et al. 1993 and
Kester 1991). While Japanese nonfinancial firms
obtained only 15 percent of their total gross
external financing from securities markets be-
tween the years 1970 and 1985, from 1986 to
1990 they obtained over 30 percent from bond
and equity markets.22 What these changes mean
for the mechanisms of corporate control em-
ployed in Japan is not clear. It may mean that
takeovers start to become more frequently
used to discipline management. However
methods of corporate control evolve, and there
will likely be significant changes from the pre-
vious regime.
The German legal and regulatory en-
vironment has also shown recent signs of
changing. As part of the attempt to compete
with London as a center of finance, many of
the restrictions on corporate finance have been
relaxed (see Deutsche Bundesbank, March 1992).
In addition, other aspects of the German legal
and regulatory framework will have to change
under planned European Economic Community
reforms. As in Japan, this may increase the role
of securities markets in the financing of German
firms. Again, how methods of corporate control
will change is unclear.
The U.S. financial system has also been
changing, albeit much more slowly than those in
Japan and Germany. Some restrictions, such as
the SEC’s rules on shareholder activism, have
already been loosened and have led to some
institutional investors flexing their muscles
somewhat. However, the wide variety of dif-
ferent laws that support the U.S. system of
corporate control—portfolio regulations on
financial institutions, tax laws, antitrust rules,
and securities laws—means that any changes
are likely to be evolutionary rather than revolu-
tionary.
Implications of changing legal and
regulatory environments
This article has shown that differences in
the legal and regulatory environment pertaining
to corporate ownership by financial institutions
and to corporate securities market development
have been of great importance in determining
differences in the finance and governance sys-
tems observed across the industrialized coun-
tries. It follows that as these legal and regulatory
environments change, so will methods of fi-
nance and governance. As noted above, there is
clearly some long-term convergence going on in
the legal and regulatory environments of the
United States, Japan, and Germany, and the
focal point of this convergence is not the Japa-
nese/German or U.S. system as it currently exists
but an environment in which banks are free to
conduct investment and commercial banking
activities (including active investments in firms)
and corporate securities markets are unhindered
by regulatory and legal obstacles.
What will be the primary mechanisms of
corporate finance and control in such a system?
This is a difficult question because we do not
have models among the developed industrial-
ized countries we can look at that embody such
a legal and regulatory environment. The closest
to this model might arguably be the United
States in the early twentieth century. In the
United States in the 1920s, firms had rela-
tively free access to nonbank finance, securities
markets were relatively active, and there were
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tutions to take equity and debt positions of a
size to confer some control.23 In this system,
there might plausibly be some firms that would
solve their financing and governance problems
better by using intermediated finance from in-
termediaries that also take active equity posi-
tions in the firm, while others might better rely
on securities markets for external finance and
an active takeover market for corporate control.
Just how and why this “mix” occurs is a subject
worth further investigation in the form of a more
detailed analysis of this period in U.S. financial
history.
For the United States, the movement to-
ward a more deregulated environment for finan-
cial intermediaries should not necessarily be
viewed with trepidation. As pointed out, there
are some clear advantages to be gained from
letting banks and other financial intermediaries
form tighter ties with the firms to which they
lend. Perhaps the biggest concern relates to the
issue of deposit insurance. Allowing commercial
banks to engage in investment banking activi-
ties, including the holding of corporate equity,
clearly requires a thorough review of the impli-
cations for the deposit insurance fund and pos-
sible modifications to the U.S. deposit insurance
system.
Notes
1 For example, see Jensen (1989), Kester (1991),
Bisignano (1990), Porter (1992), Franks and Mayer
(1992 and 1990), Bhide (1993), Roe (1993), Edwards
and Fischer (1994), and Charkham (1994).
2 An exception is Roe (1993).
3 A recent manifestation of this is the Council on Com-
petitiveness’ 1992 report, Capital Choices: Changing
the Way America Invests in Industry. See Porter (1992).
4 Recent innovations in asset-backed commercial paper
programs and other credit-enhancement techniques
are, however, allowing smaller, less highly rated firms
to access the commercial paper market.
5 See Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995) for evidence
on these trends in bank lending.
6 See Carey, Prowse, Rea, and Udell (1993).
7 Large firms will also use the private equity market on
occasion. See Fenn, Liang, and Prowse (1995).
8 1985 is chosen as the year for comparison because it
reflects the situation in Japan prior to much of the
corporate securities market deregulation in the second
half of the 1980s.
9 See Prowse (1995).
10 Comparing unadjusted stock market capitalization
across countries can be misleading if there is a high
degree of intercorporate shareholding in one country
because these shares are double-counted.
11 See Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny (1989).
12 Thus, Roe (1993), Allen and Gale (1996), Boot and
Thakor (1996), Gorton and Schmidt (1992), and
Calomiris (1993) distinguish the U.S. and German
financial systems solely on the principle of universal
banking, with no acknowledgement of the severe
restrictions on corporate securities markets in Germany.
13 For a detailed description of these restrictions, see
Roe (1990) and Prowse (1995 and 1990).
14 Bank holding companies are regulated by the Federal
Reserve Board under the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956. In addition, they may purchase up to 24.9
percent of a nonbank firm’s total capital (including
subordinated debt and nonvoting stock); again, the
investment must be passive. See Carey et al. (1993).
15 The most onerous appears to be the requirement that
total qualifying investments in equity and real estate
should not exceed the bank’s capital. A qualifying
investment is one in which the bank takes a greater
than 10-percent share of the enterprise. See Deutsche
Bundesbank (1991).
16 See Nomura Securities (1989).
17 See Döser and Brodersen (1990).
18 See OECD (1989).
19 See, for example, Kester and Luehrman (1992).
20 That is, banks in Japan and Germany are the very
institutions that are themselves diffusely held by share-
holders. Thus, there may be a problem in ensuring that
banks in these countries act to maximize value and
conduct the monitoring function in an efficient manner
in the firms in which they have large stakes.
21 Two examples would be during periods when the
financing for takeovers becomes scarce and when,
in particular industries such as commercial banking,
regulatory constraints effectively preclude hostile
takeovers. See Prowse (1995). Regarding the corpo-
rate control mechanism in U.S. commercial banks, see
Prowse (1994).
22 See Prowse (1995). See also Bank of Japan (1992).
23 See, for example, De Long (1990).
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